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Abstract 
 
Authentication is an essential part of any network 
and plays a pivotal role in ensuring the security of a 
network by preventing unauthorised devices/users 
access to the network. As dynamic wireless mesh 
networks are evolving and being accepted in various 
fields, there is a strong need to improve the security of 
the network. It’s features like self-organizing and self-
healing make it great but get undermined when rigid 
authentication schemes are used. We propose a hybrid 
authentication scheme for such dynamic mesh 
networks under three specified scenarios; full 
authentication, quick authentication and new node 
authentication. The proposed schemes are applied on 
our previous works on dynamic mesh routing protocol, 
Geo location Oriented Routing Protocol (GLOR 
Simulation results show our proposed scheme is 
efficient in terms of resource utilization as well as 
defending against security threats. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The mesh networks have evolved a great length in 
the past few years and are being used extensively for 
device to device communication. They feature a self-
sustained network model where the data is transmitted 
from one point to other by the concept of hopping. This 
is achieved by connecting multiple devices together 
and then sending the data from the host device to the 
next device and repeating this process multiple times 
until the data finally reaches the destination node. This 
can be achieved through unicast/multicast routing 
where a single or multiple path is used to send data or 
by flooding the whole network with the data. 
A typical mesh network can be either static or 
dynamic, depending upon the type of connected 
devices. If stationary/fixed devices form the mesh 
network, it is known as a static mesh network. It can be 
wired, wireless or a combination of both depending 
upon how devices connect to each other. 
However, the dynamic mesh network is formed by 
mobile/portable devices but at the same time supports 
static devices as well. As the major part of the network 
consists of mobile/portable devices, all the devices use 
wireless communication to connect to each other. 
Hence it is known as the dynamic wireless mesh 
network and is a great platform for high performance 
devices such as smartphones, laptops, tablets, etc. 
The dynamic wireless mesh network is a recent 
network type, which along with all the great features of 
mesh networks also provides a potential to expand 
easily. With a new network model custom-tailored for 
it, the dynamic wireless mesh network can start as a 
backup communication network that can work without 
any expensive infrastructure and someday may become 
a primary communication network. 
The mesh network comprises of various noble 
features such as self-configuration, which allows the 
devices to connect and create the network without any 
external control entity. It involves low operating costs 
as the network is composed of user devices, which are 
easily, setup by implementing an identical protocol on 
all devices. The maintenance of the network can be 
considered by the device owners while providing 
robustness as multiple devices create redundant 
connections. A dynamic size can adapt according to the 
number of devices. In addition, the self-healing 
properties also make wireless mesh networks ideal 
network choice for future. 
However, it is important to note that, mesh network 
sometimes is unable to perform at its full potential as 
the current/legacy protocols limit the extent of its 
features and size [1]. Aspects such as IP addressing 
requires a central server to manage the network which 
makes the network dependent on the server destroying 
its self-configuration properties [2]. 
As the mesh network works by sending data 
through multiple devices, these devices have access to 
the data flowing through the network [3]. This raises 
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 various security concerns as the network becomes 
prone to even the simplest attacks such as 
eavesdropping which can compromise the privacy of 
the users and the integrity of the network. 
Hence, along with various other network models, 
security has also become a must for mesh networks 
too. Recently, various security models have been 
developed for the mesh network [1 - 22], however the 
security models themselves have become another 
factor prevents the mesh to expand. To provide high 
levels of security, a central controller is used to 
manage the network, which indecently prevents the 
network from expanding and working at its true 
potential. 
In this paper, we present various related/existing 
security schemes, how they implement authentication 
and their limitations in Section 2.1. Section 2.2 defines 
the problem statement whilst providing a summary on 
the main challenges. Following that, the paper presents 
briefly the Geo Location Oriented Routing (GLOR) 
protocol and its current authentications scheme in 
Section 3 and explains how we incorporate its new 
features for the lightweight hybrid authentication 
model. Section 4 presents our proposed authentication 
scheme with various scenarios and how they work to 
provide better security. Section 5 presents the 
simulation results and analysis and finally, we 
conclude the paper in Section 6.  
 
2. Related Works and Problem Statement  
 
The wireless mesh network is prone to various 
types of threats ranging from basic attacks like Denial 
of Service, Eavesdropping, Spoofing, Flooding, etc., 
all the way to much advanced attacks such as the 
Sinkhole attack, Impersonation, Sybil attack, data 
redirect, and many more [1,13]. In essence, most of the 
attacks in mesh networks can be traced to a 
compromised device or an unauthorised access to the 
network. Hence authentication plays a crucial and 
integral part preserving security of the network by 
keeping the attackers away from accessing the 
network. 
 
2.1. Related works 
  
The wireless mesh network has some well-known 
routing techniques such as the OLSR (Optimized Link 
State Routing) [8, 9, 10] and AODV (Ad hoc On-
Demand Distance Vector) [12], both these schemes 
have almost no security aspect by themselves but, 
lately they have been modified to include security. 
SOLSR is a secure version of the OLSR protocol 
which uses features like message authentication codes 
(MAC’s), timestamping and cryptographic signatures 
to prevent the most common attacks on OSLR such as 
identity spoofing, link spoofing, tc packet spoofing 
[14]. 
Similarly, SAODV is a secure version of AODV 
protocol which implements two mechanisms, digital 
signatures [4] and hash chains, to provide security and 
ensure the integrity of the network [15]. There are 
various other protocols such as ARAN (Authenticate 
Routing for Ad hoc Networks), which uses a single 
trusted key pair for the whole network to ensure 
security [16]. SRP (Secure Routing Protocol) [17], 
SMT (Secure Message Transmission Protocol) [19] 
and SAR (Security-Aware Ad Hoc Routing Protocol) 
[20] use shared secret key amongst devices to verify 
packets. Protocols like SEAD (Secure Efficient Ad 
Hoc Distance Vector Routing Protocol) [18] and SLSP 
(Secure Link State Routing Protocol) [21] use table-
driven approach along with time-synchronization or 
secret key exchange and other similar featured 
protocols. 
However, most security schemes are either based 
on flooding technique, which increases the network 
load on each device, or they require an existing 
security association between the devices. Others such 
as OLSR are known to self-saturate the network just by 
overcrowding of Hello messages. 
Hybrid Authentication is a must for multihop 
networks as it can provide redundant ways in which a 
device can authenticate itself or other devices [24, 25]. 
It is also certain that there is a need for an 
authentication server to verify and keep a check on all 
the authentications. At the same time, there must exist 
other equally secure ways of authentication so that the 
network can function even if the authentication server 
is unreachable [26, 27]. A similar approach that 
implements hybrid authentication is presented in [22] 
which, discusses a multi-level model for 
authentication. However, the model can only be 
applied to static wireless mesh networks and not the 
dynamic wireless mesh networks.  
 
2.2. Problem Statement 
  
The dynamic wireless mesh network requires a 
dynamic security model comprising of a new 
authentication scheme, which can adapt to various 
scenarios and still be able to provide high levels of 
security. As it is made up of mobile devices, which 
keep switching connections as they move, a static 
authentication scheme with rigid rules will slow down 
the network. 
In addition, a mobile device in the network might 
not always have access to the authentication server and 
will be unable to gain network access which will lead 
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 to a limited/fixed sized network, preventing its 
expansion and network coverage. 
 
3. The GLOR routing model 
 
In our previous effort, we have developed the Geo 
Location Oriented Routing (GLOR) protocol [2], 
which is more suited for dynamic wireless mesh 
networks [2]. The network model also provides a set of 
new features that can be used to implement better 
security in the network. Some of the new features of 
the GLOR protocol are as follows: 
Reverse Network Model: The devices that make 
up the mesh network are self-maintained and 
contribute resources to maintain the network as well 
removing the need of centralised control. 
New Addressing Scheme: As the name of the 
protocol suggests, it uses geo-location as the address of 
a device in place of the IP address. 
Smart Packets: As the protocol uses geo-location, 
a data packet equipped with the geo-location of its 
destination can dynamically find a path through the 
devices without mapping the whole network. 
Security Model: The GLOR security model 
includes basic authentication, monitoring and an end-
to-end encryption [23], which is achieved using 
asymmetric encryption (Public – Private key pair) [10]. 
Web Register: It is defined as the “yellow pages” 
of the GLOR network model and is responsible for 
storing information like mac address, unique ID, 
location, public encryption key, etc. for every 
registered device on the network. Its purpose is to keep 
records in the cloud that can be accessed for 
authentication purposes and to provide device location 
information for better routing efficiency. 
Although the protocol provides an adequate 
authentication scheme, it does not take into account the 
various scenarios a new device can encounter during 
the authentication process. With all the above features, 
the GLOR protocol provides the required features and 
the platform to be suitable for a new dynamic 
authentication model. Hence, this paper builds upon 
the existing work done by the authors [2, 3, 23]. 
 
4. Authentication Mechanism  
 
The GLOR model presents a basic authentication 
scheme [3], which is dependent on the web register for 
verification of the device details. However, getting 
access to the web register might not always be 
possible. This can result in a long delay for the new 
device to gain access to the network. 
In addition, the authentication process requires the 
devices to first establish a connection to the network 
and is then authenticated which poses a security threat 
to the network itself. 
In order to make the authentication process faster 
and much more secure, we propose three scenarios 
which encapsulate all possible conditions a device can 
encounter while establishing a connection to the 
network. During authentication, the new device is kept 
in a sandbox scenario, which prevents the new device to 
discover any further details about the network. The new 
device is not provided network access until the 
authentication is successful. The three distinct 
scenarios are described as following. 
Full Authentication: In this scenario, a device is 
reconnecting to the network and is authenticated by a 
Node which, has a direct or indirect link to the web 
register. On successful authentication, the network 
device will grant the new device network access along 
with the right to authenticate other devices. 
 
Table 1: List of Components 
Term Component Description 
Node 
Network  
Device 
A device with established 
connection to the network 
and is authorized to 
authenticate other devices. 
Device 
New  
Device 
A device which wishes to 
join the network. 
WR 
Web  
Register 
A database that stores 
network device information 
such as Unique ID, MAC, 
Address, Public Key, etc. 
UID Unique ID 
A unique identifier generated 
and provided to each node by 
the Web Register. It is linked 
with each device’s MAC. 
ADDR 
Geo-
Location 
Address 
Physical position (two 
dimensional) of the device 
determined through its 
latitude and longitude 
coordinates 
KPU Public Key 
RSA-2048 based encryption 
key pair used for 
authentication and End-to-
End encryption. Each device 
gets its own key pair. KPI Private Key 
KCR Crypto Key 
AES-256 based encryption 
key provided to each device 
at registration. 
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Fig. 2: Full Authentication Process 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Authentication Scenario Selection 
 
Quick Authentication: In this scenario, the device is 
reconnecting to the network and is authenticated by a 
network device which does not possess a direct or 
indirect link to the web register at the moment. In this 
scenario, the network device itself carries out the 
authentication. On successful authentication, the new 
device is granted network access but not the right to 
authenticate new devices until the network device has 
verified the new device’s information with the web 
register. 
New Node Authentication: In this scenario, an 
unregistered device (which has never connected to the 
network) wants to join the network. For this scenario, it 
is vital that the network device maintains a direct or 
indirect access to the web register. This is required as 
all the device information collected must be recorded 
at the web register for pre-registration authentication 
and the registration process. 
Once the Node has collected enough information 
about the Device, it decides upon the authentication 
scenario to be used. The decision on which scenario 
the device must pass through is based on the 
availability of; the new device’s unique ID and access 
to the web register as shown in Fig. 1. The presence of 
UID implies that the new device has been registered 
and is re-connecting to the network. 
Table 1 lists various components of the hybrid 
authentication model and associated terms used to 
represent them. 
The authentication scheme is based on challenge-
response technique and uses a mathematical equation 
along with the encryption keys to verify the device. All 
the encryption keys that are used during the 
authentication process are stored in a TPM (Trusted 
Platform Module) style device. Such device is then 
used to prevent any unauthorized access to the 
sensitive information if a device on the networks is 
internally compromised. The authentication scenarios 
are discussed in details below. 
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Fig. 3: Quick Authentication Process 
 
 
Fig. 4: Registration and New Node Authentication 
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 4.1. Scenario 1 – Full Authentication 
  
The steps in full authentication process are divided 
into four major parts: Handshake, Device Information 
Collection, Challenge and Decision as shown in Fig. 2. 
Individual processes are defined as follows. 
Algorithm 1: Scenario-1 Challenge 
KPI(D) - private key of D; KPU(D) - public key of D 
VAR - Variable; OPR - Operator; RLT() – Result; 
CLN - Challenge; RES – Response 
 
1. Get device encryption key 
Node requests WR for KPU(Device) 
Node (Device(UID||MAC)) → WR 
If WR found Device in the register and verified 
WR → Node: (KPU(Device)) 
2. Create challenge 
Node uses random function to generate equation 
Node(Random) = VAR1, VAR2 & OPR1 
Node checks if equation is valid 
RLT(Node) = VAR1 OPR VAR2 
If RLT(Computable) = True, Go To Step 3. 
If RLT(Computable) = False, Repeat 2. 
3. Send challenge 
Node uses KPU(Device) to encrypt challenge and add 
KPU(Node) 
CLN = KPU(Device)[VAR1 OPR VAR2 || KPU(Node)] 
Node → Device: (CLN) 
 
 
4. Solve response 
Device uses KPI(Device) to decrypt and solve 
challenge 
KPI(Device)[CLN] = VAR1 OPR VAR2 || KPU(Node) 
RLT = VAR1 OPR VAR2 
Device uses KPU(Node) to send the response 
RES = KPU(Node)[RLT] 
Device → Node: (RES) 
5. Verify response 
Node extracts the response using KPI(Node) 
KPI(Node)[RES] = RLT(Device) 
If RLT(Node) == RLT(Device), Grant Net Access & 
Authentication Rights 
Node (Device(Connected)) → WR 
If RLT(Node) =! RLT(Device), Authentication Fail 
Node (Device(Flagged)) → WR 
Handshake: The very first step for the Device is to 
scan its surroundings for devices using the GLOR 
protocol. Once a Node (a device implementing the 
GLOR protocol and being connected to the network) is 
found, the Device will initiate a handshake request.  
The Node will then respond to the request to 
complete the handshake. Once the Handshake is over, 
the Device requests the Node for network access, 
which then initiates the authentication process. 
Device Information Collection: Before the 
authentication process begins, the Node must first 
request the Device for its information including details 
such as UID, MAC, ADDR, etc. The Device must then 
provide the above-mentioned information to the Node 
as these details play an important role in verifying the 
status of the device. 
The Node will first check if the Device has a UID 
as it is only provided to registered devices. Once the 
presence of UID has been verified, the device 
information is forwarded to WR. 
Algorithm 1 provides details on the creation and the 
process of challenge-response used in scenario 1. 
Challenge: Once WR receives the Device’s 
information, it looks for the device records in its own 
database by referring to the UID. Once the details are 
found, they are compared with the Device’s details 
provided by the Node. If the details match, the Device 
is verified and web register sends the KPU(Device) to 
the Node. 
Upon receiving the KPU(Device), the Node will 
then create a random mathematical challenge where 
both the values and the operation will be chosen at 
random (e.g. “10 ^ 4”, “74 / 3 * 4”, etc.). This 
challenge will then be encrypted using the KPU(Device) 
and sent across to the Device ensuring that only the 
device that possesses the KPI(Device) (Stored in the 
Trusted Platform Module) will be able to decrypt the 
challenge and solve it.  
To ensure there is no intrusion during the process, 
the Node will also send along its own KPU(Node) so 
that the challenge response is also encrypted. The 
Device can now use KPI(Device) to decrypt the 
challenge, solve the equation and use the KPU(Node) to 
encrypt the result and send the response back. 
Decision: Upon receiving the response from the 
Device, the Node will decrypt the response with 
KPI(Node) and check the result. Once the result is 
verified, the Node will finally provide network access 
to the Device along with the right to authenticate other 
devices on the behalf of the network. The Node will 
also send an update to the WR informing that the 
Device has gone through the authentication process 
and has been verified and provided network access.  
The WR will update the ADDR and last seen 
information in its records for the Device and enable the 
right to authenticate. This will ensure no node can add 
another Device until it has been verified by the WR. 
 
4.2. Scenario 2 – Quick Authentication 
  
Like the full authentication process, the quick 
authentication process is also divided into four major 
Page 5537
 parts: Handshake, Device Information Collection, 
Challenge and Decision as shown in Fig. 3. 
Handshake: This process is identical to the one 
used in the previous scenario.  
Device Information Collection: Before the 
authentication process begins, the Node must first 
request the Device for its information which, includes 
details such as UID, MAC, ADDR, etc. The Device 
must then provide the above-mentioned information to 
the Node as these details play an important role in 
verifying the device. 
The Node will first check if the Device has a UID 
as it is only provided to registered devices. Once the 
presence of UID has been verified, the device checks if 
it can access the WR. 
Algorithm 2 presents the technical exchange that 
takes place during this authentication process.  
 
Algorithm 2: Scenario-2 Challenge 
KCR - crypto key; VAR - Variable; OPR - Operator; 
RLT() - Result; CLN - Challenge; RES - Response 
 
1. Create challenge 
Node uses random function to generate equation 
Node(Random) = VAR1, VAR2 & OPR1 
Node checks if equation is valid 
RLT(Node) = VAR1 OPR VAR2 
If RLT(Computable) = True, Go To Step 2. 
If RLT(Computable) = False, Repeat 1. 
2. Send challenge 
Node uses KCR to encrypt challenge 
CLN = KCR[VAR1 OPR VAR2] 
Node → Device: (CLN) 
3. Solve response 
Device uses KCR to decrypt and solve challenge 
KCR[CLN] = VAR1 OPR VAR2 
RLT = VAR1 OPR VAR2 
Device uses KCR to send the response 
RES = KCR[RLT] 
Device → Node: (RES) 
4. Verify response 
Node extracts the response using KCR 
KCR[RES] = RLT(Device) 
If RLT(Node) == RLT(Device), Grant Net Access 
Wait for Connection → WR 
Node (Device(UID||MAC||Connected)) → WR 
If RLT(Node) =! RLT(Device), Authentication Fail 
Wait for Connection → WR 
Node (Device(UID||MAC||Flagged)) → WR 
Challenge: As the WR is not available or times 
out, the Node must follow the quick authentication 
process. As the Node cannot receive the KPU(Device) 
from the WR, it uses the GLOR KCR (a symmetric 
encryption key). 
The Node will create a random mathematical 
challenge where both the values and the operation will 
be chosen at random (e.g. “10 ^ 4”, “74 / 3 * 4”, etc.). 
This challenge will then be encrypted using the KCR 
and sent across to the Device, ensuring that once again 
only a registered device will be able to decrypt the 
challenge. This is possible because the KCR is only 
provided to registered devices during their first 
registration and is stored in a Trusted Platform Module 
(which is known to be extremely secure) only to be 
accessed by the GLOR protocol for encryption and 
decryption purposes. 
Decision: Upon receiving the response from the 
Device, the Node will decrypt the response with the 
KCR and check the result. Once the result is verified, 
the Node will finally provide network access to the 
Device. However, the Node will not provide the right 
to authenticate other devices until a verification is done 
by the WR. The Node will now wait for an access to 
the WR and inform it once the connection is achieved 
and the Device is verified and connected. 
The WR will check the device information against 
its records and if verified, it will provide the Device 
with the right to authenticate other Devices on the 
behalf of the network. The WR will also update the 
ADDR and last seen information in its records. 
This scenario introduces a new KCR (AES 256) 
[11,12] which, provides an alternate method for 
authentication if the WR is not available. The KCR 
referred here as universal and is saved inside a trusted 
platform module (or a trusted execution environment 
for devices that do not possess the hardware). The KCR 
can only be accessed by the GLOR protocol for 
encryption-decryption purposes in case no immediate 
access to the WR is available. 
The Device can now use its KCR to decrypt the 
challenge and solve it. Once solved the Device will 
again use KCR to encrypt the result and send the 
response back to the Node. 
 
4.3. Scenario 3 – New Node Authentication  
  
In this scenario, we take into account the device 
that is connecting to the network for the first time 
hence; it does not have any UID. In addition, the WR 
will not also contain any record matching the Device's 
information. Hence, a new record will be created as 
shown in Fig. 4. 
This scenario also incorporates the device 
registration process as defined by GLOR [2]. The new 
node authentication scenario is divided into four parts: 
Handshake, Device Information Collection, 
Verification and Registration. 
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 Handshake: This process is identical to the one 
used in the previous scenario.  
Device Information Collection: Similar to the 
previous scenarios, the Node first requests the Device 
for its information. The Device must provide the 
required information, however, unlike the first two 
scenarios, it would not contain any UID. On verifying 
that the Device does not possess a UID, the Node must 
begin the registration process on it’s own. 
Verification and Registration: Before the Device 
can register; the Node must setup a secure connection 
to the Device as well as the WR to verify the details 
provided. To do so, the Device is asked to generate a 
new key pair KPI(Device) and KPU(Device), from 
which the KPI(Device) is submitted to the trusted 
module and the KPU(Device) is shared with the Node. 
Once the communication is secured, the Node will 
send the data to the WR for verification. 
The WR upon receiving the Device’s information 
will check if any matching records exist to make sure 
duplicate records are not found. If no duplicate records 
are found, the WR will create a record for the Device 
and generate a UID to map the device’s information. 
The WR will then send the registration details to the 
Node, which will pass it onto the Device. 
Once this process is complete, the Device will be 
provided network access by the Node and also given 
the right to authenticate other devices on behalf of the 
network.  
 
5. Simulation and Results 
 
The simulation for the authentication model using 
GLOR protocol has been developed in Visual Studio 
using C#. The machine used for simulation is powered 
by a 6th Gen. Intel i7 (3.1 GHz) CPU and with 16GB 
DDR3L RAM running Windows 10. 
 
5.1. Environment Setup 
  
The environment consists of two Smart Devices 
(both implementing the GLOR protocol), one of which 
being part of the network (Node) and the other 
attempts to connect to the network (Device). The Web 
Register (WR) is implemented using a local SQL 
database. The Device and Node have been allocated a 
maximum transmission speed of 11Mbps, which is an 
average speed of transmission based on the oldest non-
legacy hardware still in use (Wi-Fi or Bluetooth). The 
transmission and processing times are calculated based 
on the processing power and transmission speed of the 
devices.  
For the simulation environment, we consider following 
assumptions: 
• None of the devices fail during the operation 
• Both devices have the capability to calculate its 
Geo-Location (ADDR) 
• There is no data loss during transmission. 
• For scenario 1, the Node has a direct connection to 
the WR  
 
5.2. Results and Analysis 
  
The simulation involves the Device starting the 
authentication process by initiating the handshake with 
the Node. The simulation then proceeds along as 
defined in the scenarios. The simulation does not 
involve Scenario 3 (New Node Authentication) as it is 
an extension of full authentication and hence, would 
have similar results. 
Simulation is conducted separately for each 
scenario and collecting information on transmission 
time, CPU utilisation, and memory utilisation. This 
provides us with valuable information about how the 
network performs under different conditions. 
 
 
Fig. 5: Scenario 1 timeline 
 
The simulation for Scenario 1 is conducted based 
on the model description from Section 3.1. The 
simulation starts with the devices authentication 
process. We then capture the time taken for the 
authentication process to complete. Fig. 5 displays a 
timeline of the authentication process starting at 0 
seconds and finishing at 3.3 seconds while mapping the 
key tasks in between. 
The authentication process begins once the 
handshake is completed and is denoted by ‘0’ on the 
time scale in Fig. 5 & 6. Once the node has created the 
challenge it sends it to the device, the time taken until 
this point is calculated and presented in the figure. The 
next key task is calculated when the device receives the 
response and addresses it. Finally, the authentication 
process ends with the node verifying the response 
received from the device and deciding whether to 
provide access or not.  
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Fig. 6: Scenario 2 timeline 
 
Similar to Scenario 1, the simulation for Scenario 2 
is also conducted according to the process explained in 
Section 3.2. This simulation is conducted without the 
presence of the WR and uses the KCR for encryption 
and decryption. Fig. 6 displays a timeline of the 
authentication process starting at 0 seconds and 
finishing at 0.34 seconds while mapping the key tasks 
in between. 
The performance analysis for Scenario 1 and 2 
based on resource consumption is also conducted. Fig. 
7 displays the memory consumption for both Scenario 
1 and 2. Fig. 8 shows the CPU utilisation. 
As we can see in the above figures, the full 
authentication takes almost 3 seconds more than the 
quick authentication. However, the presence of both 
scenarios with their conditions together provides better 
security for the network. In terms of the performance 
analysis, both the scenarios have similar resource 
utilisation, which is mainly required for encryption and 
decryption purposes. 
 
 
 
Fig. 7 Memory Consumption 
 
 
Fig. 8. CPU usage 
 
6. Conclusion and Future Work  
 
Dynamic wireless mesh network is an emerging 
technology in the area of self-sustained formation of 
networks and holds key to evolve into next generation 
communication network. However, it is limited only by 
the static protocols and rigid security frameworks, 
which are not suitable for the dynamic network. 
The dynamic wireless mesh network requires new 
protocols and security models that are flexible and can 
adapt to various scenarios. The hybrid authentication 
scheme presented in this paper is one such aspect, 
which works according to the network rather than have 
the network work according to it.  
Along with the flexibility, the security model also 
needs to use new methods to provide higher levels of 
security as mesh networks are prone to various attacks 
as discussed in Section 1. With more security schemes 
along with new dynamic protocols like GLOR, we 
hope, the dynamic wireless mesh network can become 
better managed, more secured and scalable for the 
future. 
Our next challenge will be to incorporate the new 
hybrid authentication mechanism along with other 
security features of the GLOR security model and 
implement in a real-world scenario. The observations 
for further testing and implementation will also help in 
revealing more areas that require attention and will 
accordingly aid in the overall improvement of the 
GLOR security model. 
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